Models decomposing the redistributive effect of fiscal systems into vertical and horizontal effects are extensively used by practitioners. The Duclos, Jalbert, and Araar's (2003) model, despite its advantages, has not yet been widely employed in empirical research, possibly due to a relatively challenging implementation procedure that involves the estimation of expected post-fiscal incomes.
INTRODUCTION
have designed a comprehensive model to decompose the redistributive effect (RE) of a fiscal system into vertical, classical horizontal inequity (henceforth CHI), and reranking effects. The model is built into the framework of the Atkinson-Gini social welfare function (henceforth AGF), which first converts incomes into utilities employing the Atkinson's (1970) utility function, and then aggregates utilities using rank-dependent weights, which underlie the S-Gini and S-concentration coefficients proposed by Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Yitzhaki (1983) . 1 The DJA model has certain advantages over its competitors, the widely acknowledged Kakwani's (1984) (henceforth K84) and the Aronson, Johnson, and Lambert's (1994) (henceforth AJL) decompositions of RE. To measure the CHI effect, the researcher must determine the set of counterfactual CHI-free or expected post-fiscal incomes (EPIs) . While the AJL model relies on the formation of arbitrary groups of close equals in this task, the DJA model employs purposefully designed statistical procedures. Consequently, the implementation of the DJA model requires a certain expertise related to data smoothing and curve-fitting methods. To facilitate the application of the DJA model in empirical analysis, a module for calculation of the DJA indices from the sample data is incorporated into the software DAD (Duclos, Araar, and Fortin 2010) (henceforth DAD-DJA).
The use of DAD-DJA in research on the Croatian tax-benefit system revealed certain inaccuracies in the results. Specifically, when the ethical parameter of AGF is set to zero, the CHI effect in the DJA model should be equal to zero by construction. However, the estimated value of the CHI effect was significantly different from zero. Analysis has shown that DAD-DJA produces upward biased estimates of EPIs in the low pre-fiscal income region. Furthermore, it was revealed that the fitting procedure in DAD-DJA contains a 'bug', producing unreasonably high estimates of EPIs for the top pre-fiscal income units in the sample.
In an attempt to obtain fully accurate estimates of DJA indices, independent procedures have been developed. They are thoroughly explained in this paper to assist practitioners in implementing the DJA model and to help DAD designers improve the working of DAD-DJA. A brief overview of data smoothing methods is provided, accompanied by advice on how to accurately obtain EPIs estimates.
Relationships with other measurement models are explained.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly exposes the elements of the DJA model and its connections with other decompositions. Section 3 extensively describes the procedures of data preparation, estimation and calculation of various elements of the DJA model, and employs them on a simple hypothetical population of four income units. In section 4 the procedures are applied to data on the Croatian tax-benefit system, and the results are compared with those obtained by DAD-DJA. Section 5 concludes the paper.
THE DUCLOS-JALBERT-ARAAR MODEL
Post-fiscal income is equal to pre-fiscal income minus taxes plus benefits. The change of income inequality induced by a fiscal system consisting of taxes and benefits is called the redistributive effect (RE) . In measurement terms, we have that ∆ൌ ‫ܫ‬ሺܺሻ െ ‫ܫ‬ሺܰሻ, where ∆ represents RE, and ‫ܫ‬ሺܺሻ and ‫ܫ‬ሺܰሻ are indices of pre-and post-fiscal income inequality.
In the DJA model, inequality indices ‫ܫ‬ሺ·ሻ are derived using the Atkinson-Gini social welfare function, proposed by Duclos (2003, 2006) . For pre-fiscal income we have that
where ߝ is the ethical parameter configuring the Atkinson's (1970) utility function, ܷሺܺሺ‫‬ሻ, ߝሻ ൌ ሾܺሺ‫‬ሻሿ ଵିఌ /ሺ1 െ ߝሻ for ߝ ് 1, and ܷሺܺሺ‫‬ሻ, ߝሻ ൌ lnሾܺሺ‫‬ሻሿ for ߝ ൌ 1, with ‫‬ denoting the quantiles of the pre-fiscal income distribution, and ܺሺ‫‬ሻ the income at quantile ‫.‬ The term ν is another ethical parameter, characterizing the Donaldson and Weymark's (1980) and Yitzhaki's (1983) S-Gini rankdependent weighting scheme, ߱ሺ‫,‬ νሻ ൌ νሺ1 െ ‫‬ሻ νିଵ . The equally distributed equivalent income is an inverse function of ܹሺ·ሻ and is obtained as ξሺܺ, ߝ, νሻ ൌ ሾሺ1 െ ߝሻܹሺܺ, ߝ, νሻሿ ଵ/ሺଵିఌሻ for ߝ ് 1, and ξሺܺ, ߝ, νሻ ൌ expሾܹሺܺ, ߝ, νሻሿ for ߝ ൌ 1. Finally, the Atkinson-Gini inequality index is calculated as follows:
where ߤ is the mean pre-fiscal income. ‫ܫ‬ሺܰሻ is obtained analogously, using the quantiles of the post-fiscal income distribution.
The DJA model decomposes RE as follows:
The vertical effect, ܸ ൌ ‫ܫ‬ሺܺሻ െ ‫ܫ‬ሺܰ ா ሻ, represents the potential RE or the reduction of inequality that would be achieved by the counterfactual, CHI-free system. The discrepancy between potential and actual RE is divided into a CHI effect, ‫ܥ‬ ൌ ‫ܫ‬ሺܷ ሻ െ ‫ܫ‬ሺܰ ா ሻ, and a reranking effect, ܴ ൌ ‫ܫ‬ሺܰሻ െ ‫ܫ‬ሺܷ ሻ, which measure two different manifestations of horizontal inequity (HI). The former effect (C) measures HI emerging from violation of the 'classical horizontal equity principle', which says that equals should be treated equally. The latter effect (R) evaluates HI arising from infringement of the 'no-reranking principle', which requires the fiscal process to not change the ranks of income units in transition from pre-to post-fiscal income. Take, for example, four households of equal size. A and B have pre-fiscal incomes of 10 each, whereas C and D have prefiscal incomes of 20 each. Suppose that A, B, C, and D end up with post-fiscal incomes of 8, 16, 12, and 24, respectively. Between pre-fiscal equals (A and B; C and D) CHI has occurred, whereas between pre-fiscal unequals (B and C) reranking has taken place.
In equation (3) 
It can be shown that ‫ܫ‬ሺܺ, 0, νሻ, ‫ܫ‬ሺܰ, 0, νሻ, and ‫ܫ‬ሺܰ ா , 0, νሻ are the S-Gini coefficient of pre-fiscal income, ‫ܩ‬ሺܺ, νሻ, the S-Gini coefficient of post-fiscal income, ‫ܩ‬ሺܰ, νሻ, and the S-concentration coefficient of post-fiscal income, ‫ܦ‬ሺܰ, νሻ, respectively. 2
Consequently, ܸሺ0, νሻ is equal to the S-Gini Kakwani's (1984) index of vertical effect, ܸ ሺνሻ ൌ ‫ܩ‬ሺܺ, νሻ െ ‫ܦ‬ሺܰ, νሻ, and ܴሺ0, νሻ is the S-Gini Atkinson (1980) , Plotnick (1981) , and Kakwani's (1984) index of reranking, ܴ ሺνሻ ൌ ‫ܩ‬ሺܰ, νሻ െ ‫ܦ‬ሺܰ, νሻ. The Kakwani's (1984) decomposition of RE into vertical and horizontal components can be rewritten in S-Gini terms as
In another special case, where ν ൌ 1, the weights ߱ሺ‫,‬ νሻ are equal for all p and the reranking effect disappears. For ߝ 0, the vertical and CHI effect, ܸሺߝ, 1ሻ and ‫ܥ‬ሺߝ, 1ሻ, become the indices consistent with the Duclos and Lambert's (2000) model of HI measurement. 3
CALCULATION OF INDICES

Data Preparation
A typical research uses the following data for a household or family i: (a) unequivalized pre-and post-fiscal incomes, ܺ ሶ and ܰ ሶ ; (b) survey frequency (or sampling) weights, ݂ ; and (c) equivalence factor ߚ . The equivalized pre-and post-fiscal incomes are ܺ ൌ ܺ ሶ /ߚ and ܰ ൌ ܰ ሶ /ߚ (hereafter we deal only with equivalized incomes, calling them plainly pre-and post-fiscal incomes). The frequency weights are defined as φ ൌ ݂ ߚ . Thus, the equivalence factor ߚ is employed both for deriving the equivalized income and for weighting households of different types. 4 We form the 3 ൈ ܵ matrix ‫ۻ‬ , where ܵ is the number of households in the sample:
To obtain the matrix ‫ۻ‬ ௫ ‫ۻ(‬ ), the columns in ‫ۻ‬ are sorted in increasing order of the values from the first (second) row:
From ‫ۻ‬ ௫ we take out the values ܺ ௫ , ܰ ௫ , and φ ௫ , while from ‫ۻ‬ the values ܰ and φ
. and are extracted. Notice that the superscript x (n) denotes that income units are sorted in increasing order of pre-fiscal (post-fiscal) income.
The sample estimates of quantiles p and the weights ߱ሺ‫,‬ νሻ are obtained in the following manner:
where
When a large group of pre-fiscal exact equals exists in the sample, one of the inequality indices would be biased if based on the weights ߱ ௫,ν , namely, ‫ܫ‬ ሚ ൫ܰ ௫ , ߝ, ν; ߱ ௫,ν ൯ from equation (17) (see later discussion). Therefore, we derive a new set of weights, ω ෝ ௫,ν . Assume that income units
The procedure described by equation (8) automatically ascribes to these units the weights that are strictly decreasing in i and ‫‬ ௫ , i.e., ߱ ଵ ௫,ν ‫ڮ‬ ߱ ொ ௫,ν , although all these units have equal pre-fiscal income and rank. Therefore, we replace them with the new set of weights obtained as follows:
Thus, the original weights ߱ ௫,ν of pre-fiscal equals are transformed into their group average.
An analogous procedure should be applied to other large groups of pre-fiscal equals, if they exist in the sample.
Alternatively, we could use the original weights and randomize the order of income units Finally, analogously to the above procedures, the estimates ω ෝ ,ν are obtained from φ (for calculation of the inequality index based on ܰ ).
Indices of Inequality
The following equations show how to obtain utilities, the Gini-Atkinson welfare index, and the inequality index for pre-fiscal incomes ܺ ௫ , when ߝ ് 1:
is the mean pre-fiscal income. To shorten the presentation, the formulas referring to the case where ߝ ൌ 1 are omitted. Analogously, the utilities and indices for post-fiscal incomes ܰ are obtained, as shown by equation (16) in the Appendix. (10) and (16) However, the following identity says that the whole procedure of estimating EPUs can be circumvented, saving the practitioner's time and energy in sensitivity analysis using multiple scenarios for ν and ߝ. Genuinely, the sample estimate of ‫ܫ‬ሺܷ
equation (20), but it can be derived more simply by the inequality index ‫ܫ‬ መ ൫ܰ ௫ , ߝ, ν; ω ෝ ௫,ν ൯ from equation (18), because of the following equality:
To understand why (11) (20) as
Observe that according to (18) we would obtain the identical result for ܹ ൫ܰ
, ߝ, ν; ω ෝ ,ν ൯.
Estimation of Expected Post-fiscal Incomes and Utilities
Unlike the estimation of EPUs, the evaluation of EPIs cannot be avoided. To obtain the sample estimates of ܰ ா ሺ‫‬ሻ, we must smooth a dataset ൛ܺ ௫ , ܰ ௫ ; φ ௫ ൟ ୀଵ ௌ , i.e., approximate the mean response curve ݉ ா in the regression relationship ܰ ௫ ൌ ݉ ா ሺܺ ௫ ሻ ߜ . The estimates of EPIs are then obtained
The estimation of EPIs represents the greatest challenge in the implementation of the DJA model. Although parametric models (such as polynomial regression) can be appropriate for some datasets, it is better to rely on non-parametric approaches, assuming no a priori functional relationship between post-and pre-fiscal incomes. One such approach is the 'kernel-weighted local polynomial regression' (KWLPR). A description of the method can be found in Fan and Gijbels (1996) , Wand and Jones (1995) , Keele (2008) , and Härdle (1990) , while the software applications include Stata 12 (function lcpoly), R (function loess, package lokern, etc.), and XploRe (function lpregxest).
The choice of the degree of polynomial (p), the type of the kernel function, and the size of the kernel half-bandwidth rests on the analyst. For ‫‬ ൌ 0, KWLPR becomes the 'Nadaraya-Watson estimator' (NWE), while for ‫‬ ൌ 1 we obtain the 'local linear estimator' (LLE). Fan and Gijbels (1996) explain that the odd degree polynomials achieve the best balance between bias and variability and automatically correct the boundary problem.
Another interesting smoothing technique came to light during the research: the 'Fourier series in trigonometric form' (FSTF), which is a sum of sine and cosine functions describing a periodic signal (Faunt and Johnson 1992 
The discussion in section 2 indicated that when ߝ ൌ 0, we have that ܷሺܰ ௫ , 0ሻ ൌ ܰ ௫ , and
From equation (13) 
Decompositions
Having defined all the indices needed, we can present RE and its decompositions in terms of sample estimate formulas. RE is obtained as ∆ ൌ ‫ܫ‬ መ ሺܺ ௫ ሻ െ ‫ܫ‬ መ ሺܰ ሻ. According to the DJA model from (3), RE is decomposed as follows:
where the last row in equation (14) arrives from the property (11), by which ‫ܫ‬ መ ൫ܷ ,ఌ ൯ ൌ ‫ܫ‬ መ ሺܰ ௫ ሻ. The differences in the brackets, i.e., Setting ߝ ൌ 0 and following (4) and (5), we can calculate the S-Gini K84 decomposition as
Simple Hypothetical Example
We return to the example of four hypothetical households from section 2 to illustrate how the DJA model implementation procedures work. There are two groups of pre-fiscal equals in the sample: A and B with pre-fiscal income of 10 each belong to the lower quantile, whereas C and D with prefiscal income of 20 each belong to the upper quantile of pre-fiscal income distribution.
The first column in Table 1 shows the 'original' weights ߱ ௫,ν obtained by (8) for ν ൌ 2;
observe that A (C) obtains larger weight than B (D), although they belong to same pre-fiscal quantile. Therefore, analogously to the procedure from equation (9), we obtain the new set of weights, ω ෝ ௫,ν : for A and B (C and D) we have According to (20), for ν ൌ 2 and ߝ ൌ 0.5 we have that
and ‫ܫ‬ መ ൫ܷ ,ఌ , ߝ, ν; ω ෝ ௫,ν ൯ ൌ 0.133. Substituting back previously obtained utility terms into the expression for welfare, we obtain
which is identical to the result that would be obtained by (18):
Thus, our hypothetical example confirms the identity (11). On the other hand, indices based on the 'wrong' weights, ߱ ௫,ν , would produce quite a different picture. By (17) we have All inequality indices for ν ൌ 2 and ߝ ൌ 0.5 are presented in the first column of Table 2, together with the DJA decomposition results. Although the vertical effect of the hypothetical system is positive (ܸ ൌ 0.081), the redistributive effect is negative (∆ ൌ െ0.052), because the CHI effect ‫ܥ(‬ መ ൌ 0.026) and especially the reranking effect (ܴ ൌ 0.107) are very large.
Table 2
Another set of CHI and reranking effects is derived using ‫ܫ‬ ሚ ሺܰ ௫ ሻ, which is based on the Recall that equation (13) Table 2 shows the other results. The index ‫ܫ‬ መ ൫ܰ ா ൯ diverges highly from our estimate (0.500 vs. 0.100), but this may be due to the small sample size. We deal with the DAD-DJA estimates of EPIs in the next section.
APPLICATION: CROATIAN TAX-BENEFIT SYSTEM
Data
We analyze the fiscal system consisting of social security contributions (SSC) for the pension, health, and unemployment insurance funds, personal income tax and surtax (PITS), public pensions, and cash social benefits. 6 The data on incomes come from the Croatian household budget survey ( 
Figure 1
The mean post-fiscal incomes of groups A and B are 64 and 54 percent of mpfi, respectively.
Observe that the EPIs curve is decreasing on the interval [0, 0.1]. The following three facts taken together can explain the curious feature that the mean post-fiscal income is decreasing. First, for the majority of pensioners' households a public pension is the only source of income; since public pensions are benefits in the current scenario, the pre-fiscal income of most pensioners' households is zero. Second, majority of households with zero pre-fiscal income (group A) are pensioners'
households. Third, pensions are on average higher than other social benefits.
Estimation of Expected Post-fiscal Incomes and the Decomposition
The indices of the DJA decomposition are estimated by three models, using three different fitting methods described in section 3.3.
In model A, EPIs are estimated by KWLPR programmed in Stata 12. Following Bilger (2008) seriously damages the estimate of ߤ൫ܰ ா ൯, which will lead to biased estimates of vertical and CHI effects, as we will soon observe. Table 3 shows the results of the DJA decomposition for ν ൌ 2 and ߝ ൌ 0. All three models obtain equal values of ‫ܫ‬ መ ሺܺ ௫ ሻ and ‫ܫ‬ መ ሺܰ ሻ. Models A and B obtain the value of ‫ܫ‬ መ ሺܰ ௫ ሻ equal to 0.244337, which is almost insignificantly different from the value of ‫ܫ‬ ሚ ሺܰ ௫ ሻ obtained by model C, thanks to randomizing the order of income units within the group of zero pre-fiscal equals. If the units within the group of zero pre-fiscal equals were, by chance, sorted in increasing (or decreasing) order of post-fiscal income, the difference ห‫ܫ‬ ሚ ሺܰ ௫ ሻ െ ‫ܫ‬ መ ሺܰ ௫ ሻห for the given data set could be as high as 0.001183. The reranking and CHI effects in model C could be seriously biased.
Table 3
The estimates ‫ܫ‬ መ ൫ܰ ா ൯ obtained by A and B are close to the value of ‫ܫ‬ መ ሺܰ ௫ ሻ, as expected from equation (13) 
Table 4
Model C thus underestimates the vertical effect by about 3 percent of RE for ν ൌ 2 and ߝ ൌ 0.
This underestimation is even larger (somewhat smaller) for ν ൌ 1.5 and ߝ ൌ 0 ( ν ൌ 3 and ߝ ൌ 0) and amounts to 5.9 (2.4) percent of RE, as Table 4 indicates. Among the scenarios shown in Table 4 , the differences in the estimates of vertical effect obtained by models C and A (B) are lowest when ν ൌ 2 and ߝ ൌ 0.9, equaling 0.8 (0.9) percent of RE.
CONCLUSION
Models decomposing the redistributive effect of fiscal systems into vertical and horizontal effects are extensively used by practitioners. The Duclos, Jalbert, and Araar (2003) model, despite its advantages over some other models, such as the Kakwani's (1984) and the Aronson, Johnson and Lambert's (1994) decompositions of RE, has not yet been broadly employed in empirical research.
The reason may be the relatively complex implementation procedure, which involves nonparametric methods in estimation of expected post-fiscal incomes.
To override these estimation and calculation difficulties, the designers of the software DAD have incorporated a module for estimation of the DJA model indices, here referred to as DAD-DJA.
However, as the application data on the Croatian tax-benefit system indicates, DAD-DJA produces somewhat inaccurate estimates of EPIs, resulting in biased values of DJA model indices. This paper carefully explains the estimation procedures needed to obtain the indices of the DJA model, and the problems occurring in DAD-DJA implementation.
The estimates of expected post-fiscal incomes are obtained by two fitting methods, kernelweighted local polynomial regression and Fourier series in trigonometric form. Both achieve reasonable fit of the data at stake, unlike the method built into DAD-DJA, which seems to overestimate EPIs at the bottom region of pre-fiscal income distribution. Furthermore, we have realized that the fitting procedure in DAD-DJA contains a 'bug', producing unreasonably high estimates of EPIs for the top pre-fiscal income units in the sample.
We have shown how the estimation of EPUs can be circumvented, saving a practitioner time when doing multiple-scenario analysis. Instead of estimating EPUs for each different value of parameter ε , the index of inequality based on EPUs can be obtained simply by using post-fiscal incomes ordered according to pre-fiscal incomes. In this procedure, however, caution must be taken in the presence of large groups of exact pre-fiscal equals: they should all be ascribed identical ranking weights. Otherwise, an estimate of reranking effect would be biased.
ENDNOTES
1 Duclos (2003, 2006) describe the properties of AGF based inequality indices: "Income inequality aversion is captured by decreasing marginal utilities, and aversion to rank inequality is captured by rank-dependent ethical weights, thus providing an ethically-flexible dual basis for the assessment of inequality and equity" (Araar and Duclos 2006, 192) . Furthermore, it is shown that AGF is the only family of social evaluation functions "to obey a set of popular axioms in the income distribution literature" (Araar and Duclos 2006, 204) .
2 Independent proof of this relationship can be found in Yitzhaki and Olkin (1991) , who derive the Table 1 Hypothetical population: weight, incomes, and utilities Note: weights are obtained for ν ൌ 2; utilities are obtained for ߝ ൌ 0.5. Table 2 Indices obtained for hypothetical population Table 3 Decomposition of redistributive effect for ν ൌ 2 and ߝ ൌ 0 
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# ߱ ௫ ω ෝ ௫ ܺ ௫ ܰ ௫ ܰ ܰ ா ܷሺܺ ௫ ሻ ܷሺܰ ௫ ሻ ܷሺܰ ሻ ܷሺܰ ா ሻ ܷ ,ν ൌ 2 ߝ ൌ 0.5 ν ൌ 2 ߝ ൌ 0 DAD-DJA ν ൌ 2 ߝ ൌ 0 ‫ܫ‬ መ ሺܺ ௫ ሻ 0
